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HOW ACTIONS AFFIRM: REFLECTIONS ON THE QUESTION 
OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
Doron Menashe* 
I. INTRODUCTION  
One of the greatest questions posed by the policy of affirmative 
action concerns the extent to which it is justified to promote an 
individual belonging to a minority group, be their personal attributes 
what they may, over another individual with at least nominally 
superior qualifications for the advancement in question, but who 
happens to belong to the majority group, solely on the basis of their 
group affiliation.1 
A classic example that has been used to represent this dilemma 
is the “coal miner’s daughter” scenario.  In this scenario, the question 
arises of how to justify—if it is indeed justified—the preference to 
admit X, the son of an African-American neurosurgeon from 
Pittsburgh, into academic studies instead of Y, the white daughter of 
an Appalachian coal miner.2  This example characterizes a scenario 
wherein the racial disparity is not particularly informative as to the 
individual circumstances of the candidates in question, and challenges 
the proponent of affirmative action to justify its application in such a 
case.  In this case, the archetypal profile of X, as ought to have been 
evident from his association with a persecuted minority (in this case, 
the African-American subgroup, which can be assumed to be a 
 
*Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Haifa, Israel. I am greatly indebted to  
Shai Otzari Eyal Gruner and Kovi Skier for their excellent research assistance. 
1  This is an attempt to compile a comprehensive definition, using minimal assumptions 
regarding the 
 groups involved and the resources in competition. Such a definition has yet to be presented in 
the literature on this subject. For various examples of definitions of affirmative action, see 
R.K. Fullinwider, THE REVERSE DISCRIMINATION CONTROVERSY 18 (Rwman & Lttlefield eds., 
1980); Mitchell H. Rubinstein, “The Affirmative Action Controversy”, 3(1) HOFSTRA LABOR 
& EMPLOYMENT L. J., 11 (1985); Jesse H. Choper, “The Constitutionality of Affirmative 
Action: Views from the Supreme Court”. 70 KY. L.J. 1 (1981-1982). 
2 GEORGE VECSEY & LORETTA LYNN, LORETTA LYNN: COAL MINER’S DAUGHTER (1976). 
1
Menashe: How Actions Affirm
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
524 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 36 
statistically weaker socio-economic population, such as would warrant 
the correction of said inequality through affirmative action), appears 
to be obscured by the individual traits associated with X himself.  
If we were to concede that affirmative action should be 
eschewed in such a case, this would give rise to a greater underlying 
difficulty: If the stated estimated profile of the minority group (i.e., the 
estimate that they are, as a group, a statistically weaker socio-economic 
population) is the only basis for their eligibility to trigger a correction 
in their favor, why should we rely on such a figure at all, when more 
precise individual figures could be obtained in lieu of statistical 
generalization?  
The exercise brought down above thus gives rise to a more 
general moral challenge to the concept of affirmative action, and in 
what circumstances (if any) it can be justified.  Can affirmative action 
be ethically sanctioned in the case of the coal miner’s daughter?  It is 
the position of this author that, in specifically such cases, the answer 
could indeed be yes.  In this article, this author shall attempt to present 
an unexhaustive yet functional typography of various forms of 
affirmative action, focusing on their justifications relating to individual 
rights (hence the unexhaustive nature of the study, as will be clarified 
below).  This article will focus on individual rights in order to avoid 
the deeper discussion of communal rights, their origins, their 
legitimacy and their weight as compared to individual rights, and to 
focus instead on the underlying justifications for corrective 
discrimination.  This author believes that this typography may assist 
us in the future in identifying and distinguishing cases in which the 
policy of affirmative action is morally justified.3  
II. DEFINING COMMUNAL RIGHTS AND ENGINES OF 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
Some preliminary clarification is required to delineate the 
boundaries of the question at the focus of this article: This author 
believes that a distinction must be drawn between three primary 
approaches that may be taken to defining the purpose and objectives 
of affirmative action and the injustices it is intended to correct.  These 
 
3 WILLIAM A. GAMSON &ANDRE MODIGLIANI, THE CHANGING CULTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION (1994) (henceforth: GAMSON & MODIGLIANI); Jonathan S. Leonard, “The Impact of 
Affirmative Action Regulation and Equal Employment Law on Black Employment”, 4(4) J. OF 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 47 (1990). 
2
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approaches, as we will further elaborate below, are as follows: 1. 
Viewing affirmative action as a means of protecting the individual 
rights of the members of the minority group from discrimination and 
oppression; 2. Viewing affirmative action as a means of protecting 
rights associated with the entire minority group on the communal level, 
and individual rights of group members specifically derived of the 
group affiliation; and 3. Viewing affirmative action as a means of 
achieving wider societal objectives associated with diversification, 
egalitarian justice, and equality.4  
At the premise of this discussion lies a fundamental question 
regarding whether communal rights exist, and if they do, what 
comprises a “community” in this respect?  This question we will 
address only on the very superficial level, so as not to distract from the 
specific issue at hand. 
A. Affirmative Action in Defense of Communal Rights 
as Individual Rights 
One approach to tackling this fundamental question is to argue 
that communal rights exist to the extent that each of the individuals 
belonging to the group possesses the relevant right as an individual.  
Under this approach, the communal right is effectively perceived as a 
collection of individual rights, wherein the agency of the community 
is more of a representation of the combined force of the aggregated 
individual rights of the group’s comprising members.5 
B. Affirmative Action as Defense of Rights of the 
Community as a Whole and Community Derived 
Rights 
An alternative approach sees communal rights as unique and 
distinguished from individual rights.   For example, communal rights 
exist among sovereign states.  The right to secure borders or an 
 
4 Ronald R. Garet, “Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups”, 56 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1001, 1070 (1983); Taunya Lovell Banks, “What is a Community? Group Rights and 
The Constitution: The Special Case of African Americans”, 1(1) UNIV. OF MD. L. J. OF RACE, 
RELIG. GENDER & CLASS 51 (2001); David Riesman, “Democracy and Defamation: Control 
of Group Libel”, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 727, 730-731 (1942). 
5 LESLIE GREEN, TWO VIEWS OF COLLECTIVE RIGHTS, 4 CANADIAN L. & JURISPRUDENCE 
(1991); Cindy L. Holder & Jeff J. Corntassel, “Indigenous Peoples and Multicultural 
Citizenship: Bridging Collective and Individual Rights”, 24(1) HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 
126, 131-133 (2002). 
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expression of national culture cannot be seen as merely a derivative of 
the individual rights since these rights exist to fill needs that only come 
into existence by virtue of the communal entity.  This can have 
ramifications for affirmative action and its justifications as well since 
the need that it serves to address is a product of the distinct communal 
identity that has been targeted for discrimination—even if a specific 
individual did not require such assistance or did not suffer from said 
discrimination.  
This also implies a benefit to the entire group that is derived 
from the advancement of any one of its members, based on the 
interdependence of the comprising members.  In this sense, it can be 
said that any harm befalling individuals belonging to the group also 
harms the rest of the group, and, conversely, a benefit afforded any one 
member of the group also advances the rest of the group.  This 
interdependence can occur as a consequence of mutual identification 
and solidarity among the group members.6  It can also manifest in the 
influence that the individual’s personal status has on the entire 
community.  For example, if a member of the community achieves a 
certain higher status, it is likely to increase the standing of the other 
members, since the success of some members serves as anecdotal 
evidence to the collective that group members are capable of attaining 
such status, thus serving as a model for imitation and inspiration for 
other members of the community and increasing their own aggregate 
chances for success.  
Thus, in addition to understanding affirmative action as a 
means of securing uniquely communal rights, this approach retains 
some similarities to the aforementioned individualistic approach by 
also relating to the rights of individuals to receive or exercise 
individual rights, albeit through a communal medium rather than on 
the individual level.  In this sense, the right remains an individual right 
in context, but manifests as a communal right by the individual’s 
access to such rights being facilitated by their communal affiliation.7  
It is worth noting this point; that the mere fact that the discrimination 
we seek to correct occurred on the basis of group affiliation does not, 
in and of itself, imply that the injured right is not individualistic in 
nature.  For instance, if a man was discriminated against by being 
denied a position on the basis of being an African-American, or if 
 
6 Richard M. Emerson, “Power-Dependence Relations”, 27(1) AMERICAN SOCI. REV. 31 
(1962). 
7  Ibid. 
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fewer resources were invested in his learning and education on account 
of his belonging to a minority, these are still injuries incurred to his 
individual rights—i.e., his right to equal opportunities.  And yet the 
remedy for this personal infraction is facilitated on the communal 
level.  
C. Affirmative Action as Pursuit of Public Interests  
Finally, there is another approach that views affirmative action 
as a public policy initiative intended to achieve a perceived benefit to 
society at large and not just the minority population.  Under this 
approach, affirmative action is justified not because there is a specific 
need to act for the welfare of the promoted group, but because 
affirmative action serves an overarching purpose in promoting 
economic efficiency or societal stability.  As such, affirmative action 
is merely an instrument for the advancement of societal goals, and not 
specifically an act for the welfare of one or another preferred group.8  
On the practical level, this sort of affirmative action could be seen to 
include, for just one example, the allocation of resources to cultural 
institutions of a minority group (such as theater, literature, and so 
forth.)  
In this article, we will attempt to examine how each of these 
approaches is able to contend with the abovementioned challenge to 
the justification for affirmative action.  
III. DEFENDING THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION 
A. Affirmative Action as a Mechanism for Ensuring 
Equal Opportunity on the Individual Level 
As stated, it is this author’s belief that the central purpose 
behind affirmative action is to ensure equal opportunity to the 
individual.  It is important to emphasize that, notwithstanding that the 
discriminatory mechanism operates on the communal level, the 
injuries that we seek to remedy through the use of affirmative action 
are on the individual level (we are here assuming that the communal 
 
8 A.H. GOLDMAN, JUSTICE AND REVERSE DISCRIMINATION 144 (New Jersey, Princeton 
University Press, 1979). 
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arguments in favor are insufficient to justify the broad application of 
the policy of affirmative action, as we will discuss below.)9 
When the goal is to ensure equal opportunity to the individual, 
we must first examine what mechanism impaired the equality of 
opportunities in the first place, and the specific outcome of said 
mechanism.  On this plane, we can distinguish between economic 
mechanisms, which mainly affected the historical distribution of 
resources (including privilege), and between mechanisms that also 
involved the operation of oppressive ideologies, and the influence and 
potential internalization of such oppression within the minority 
group.10 
We could, theoretically, think of discrimination against women 
as being of the latter category, since this discrimination occurred on 
the basis of certain cognitive-ideological conceptions, which, in 
keeping with the prevailing feminist discourse, were further 
exacerbated by the internalization of these oppressive stereotypes by 
women.11  (It should be emphasized, in this regard, that both with 
respect to the economic mechanism and with respect to the ideological 
mechanism, our intention is not historical analysis for its own sake.  
For our purposes, these mechanisms must have consequences in the 
present that affect the equality of opportunities.)12    
By applying this rough distinction, we can more easily discern 
and isolate those cases in which it is appropriate to employ affirmative 
action solely on the basis of group affiliation as the primary variable, 
without making an attempt to investigate more particular information 
regarding the individual, even if such information is accessible.13 
 
9  David Miller, “Egalitarian justice: What the People Think,” in EGALITARIAN JUSTICE, 
ch.5 (Julian Lamont ed., 2012). 
10  Cynthia Cockburn, “Equal Opportunities: The Short and Long Agenda”, 20(2) Industrial 
Relations Journal 213 (1989); Morton Deutsch, “Equity, Equality, and Need: What Determines 
Which Value Will Be Used as the Basis of Egalitarian justice?”, 31(3) JOURNAL OF SOCIAL 
ISSUES 137 (1974) (henceforth: Deutsch, “Equity, Equality, and Need); JOHN BORDLEY 
RAWLS,  A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).  
11 Edward Luce, “Discrimination on the Basis of Gender”, 99(3) PLASTIC AND 
RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 910 (1997); S. T Fiske & L.E. Stevens, “What’s so special about 
sex? Gender stereotyping and discrimination” (1993), in 6 GENDER ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY 
SOCIETY, p. 173 (S. Oskamp & M. Costanzo eds., 1993). 
12 GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2010) (henceforth: BECKER, THE 
ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION). 
13 Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom? 47 (5) STAN.  L. REV. pp. 
855 (1995). 
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The distinction is explained more or less as follows: When the 
injury is expressed solely on the economic level, correcting the harm 
inflicted on the injured party must involve addressing their economic 
circumstances.  Therefore, specific evidence as to the individual’s 
economic circumstances, to the extent available, should be preferred 
to treatment based solely on affiliation with a group that is statistically 
shown to be economically weaker.  Thus, if we believed that the 
discriminating mechanism in the instance of the coal miner’s daughter 
resulted in purely economic consequences (though this author strongly 
doubts that we are referring to a purely economic mechanism in the 
said case), then there would be no question that it would be unjustified 
in preferring the neurosurgeon’s son, since, indeed, he is on the 
economically superior footing on the individual level.  In this case, his 
group affiliation can be used for the sake of approximation at best—
for instance, if there is no personal information available regarding the 
individuals involved.14  
The situation is different, however, with respect to mechanisms 
that operate in the framework of oppressive ideologies, in broad terms.  
This is so because, in such a case, the injury suffered by the individual 
cannot be purely expressed by the particular circumstances (economic 
or otherwise) that we are able to discern when seeking to apply 
affirmative action on the individual level.  For instance, it is possible 
that the internalization of the oppressive ideology has injured the 
subject’s hypothetical ability to utilize their full potential.  
Furthermore, it is possible (as in the feminist example) that an 
additional injury is incurred when the definition of a woman’s skills in 
relation to specific positions is itself biased in favor of oppressive 
preconceptions.  This bias impacts the opportunities of members of the 
minority group to demonstrate an adequate skill set to meet the 
requirements of the position in question.  In this case, despite that the 
injury discussed is still an individual injury (rather than an injury to a 
communal right), it would appear to be justified to use group affiliation 
as a basis for affirmative action, since the individual’s affiliation with 
the group is, in many such cases, the best epistemic variable available 
for gauging the real criteria for eligibility for intervention, which 
involve both the practical and psychological influences that 
discrimination has had on the individual.  It is, understandably, not 
 
14 Id; Sonia Liff, “Diversity and equal opportunities: room for a constructive compromise?”, 
HUM. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT JOURNAL (2006) (henceforth: Liff, Diversity and equal 
opportunities); BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION, supra, note. 28. 
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always possible to examine the psychological state of each candidate 
for a position (inter alia, because such information cannot be collected 
independently, and because the candidate’s reports are themselves 
likely to be influenced by the same mechanism of internalized 
oppression.)15  Thus, the apparent need to rely on the presumption of 
injury that arises out of the affiliation with the oppressed group. 
B. Affirmative Action as a Mechanism for Protecting 
Communal Rights 
Generally speaking, communal rights, in the sense of those 
unique to the communal level, do not give rise to the miner’s daughter 
dilemma, because their rectification is not associated with any specific 
impairment to the rights of other individuals.  In fact, the defense of 
these rights usually reverts to a question of resource allocation and 
distribution, which impact individual rights among members of the 
majority only indirectly, if at all (thus avoiding the miner’s daughter 
issue.)16  On the other hand, this form of affirmative action is 
necessarily limited in scope, and fails to fully rectify the injuries 
sustained to individuals of the threatened groups.  Similarly, such a 
limited approach sacrifices many of the perceived societal benefits of 
affirmative action as a public policy, such as diversification or 
integration (as will be explained below.)17  Thus, while the principle 
of equality is not impacted by such an approach to affirmative action—
and thus, the issue of the miner’s daughter does not arise in respect 
thereof—it remains exclusive of the vast majority of cases in which 
affirmative action is sought, and thus, insufficient as a stand-alone 
definition of communal rights for the purposes of affirmative action.  
With respect to individual rights obtained through the 
mechanism of group affiliation, the arguments provided above in 
respect of individual rights largely apply, and with them, the same 
 
15  Carolyn E. Coffey, Battling Gender Orthodoxy: Prohibiting Discrimination on the Basis 
of Gender Identity and Expression in the Courts and the Legislatures, 7(1) CITY UNIVERSITY 
OF NEW YORK L. REV. 161 (2004); M.V. LEE BADGETT, HOLNING LAU, BRAD SEARS & 
DEBORAH HO, BIAS IN THE WORKPLACE: CONSISTENT EVIDENCE OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND 
GENDER IDENTITY DISCRIMINATION (2007) (henceforth: BIAS IN THE WORKPLACE).  
16 Susan D. Clayton Sandra S. Tangri, The Justice of Affirmative Action, AFFIR. ACTION IN 
PERSPECTIVE 177 (1989). 
17  Deborah C. Malamud, ”Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle 
Class Affirmative Action: Diversity of Opinions”,  68 U. COLO. L. REV. 939 (1997) 
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conclusion: That the justification for affirmative action will tend to 
depend upon the discriminatory mechanism in play.  
C. Affirmative Action as a Matter of Public Interest 
Various justifications have been provided for the policy of 
affirmative action as a matter of public interest, such as the desire to 
achieve diversification, integration, and egalitarian justice.18  Each of 
these interact with the challenges to affirmative action in different 
ways, as we will see below: 
1. The Diversification Argument 
The diversification argument posits that there is moral and 
cultural value in ensuring the fair representation of the differing 
positions and perspectives in the diverse consciousness of a given 
population.  For this to happen, public positions must be placed in the 
hands of individuals who will serve as faithful and authentic 
representatives of such viewpoints and perspectives.  
Regarding this argument, it can be said that it, at the most, is 
able to justify a policy of affirmative action in cases of absolute 
exclusion of a particular cultural perspective.  In such a case, the only 
purpose of such a policy can be to attain a certain critical mass of 
representation, since cultural perspectives and positions do not see a 
 
18 Liff, Diversity and Equal Opportunities, supra, note 19;  Deborah C. 
Malamud, ”Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class Affirmative Action: 
Diversity of Opinions”,  68 U. COLO. L. REV. 939 (1997);  See, for instance, M. Mautner, “The 
Special Admissions Program at the Law Faculty of Tel Aviv University and Its Ramifications”, 
from AFFIRMATIVE ACTION & ENSURING REPRESENTATION IN ISR. 457, 458 (Anat Maor, 
Editor). Other key arguments to justify affirmative action, which are cumulative to the 
justifications detailed above, include the argument for compensation and the argument for 
societal benefit. The claim of compensation is based on the principle underlying the law of 
torts, whereby if A. caused damage to B, A must compensate B for his damage. In this way, if 
a particular group, for example the white racial group in the United States, caused damage to 
the Afro-American group, then every white individual must compensate for each black 
individual. The affirmative action that sees a black individual preferred to a white individual 
in acceptance to a position or academic studies is the realization of the black individual’s right 
to compensation. The argument of social utility derives from the utilitarian view of morality, 
whereby it is justified to adopt a policy that maximizes aggregate benefit or welfare in society 
and minimizes damage and suffering. The application of this argument in the context of 
affirmative action manifests in the claim that affirmative action policy will create an overall 
net, benefit and that the harm inherent in the policy is superseded by said benefit. For a 
comprehensive analysis of the various arguments for affirmative action, see: Fullinwider, 
supra, note 1, at pp. 18-19, 25-44. 
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linear increase concurrent to the increase in the number of 
representatives (the relevant variable is the number and quality of the 
perspectives introduced, rather than the number of advocates.)19  This 
is one reason why diversification is a poor argument for the sweeping 
implementation of affirmative action solutions.  
Another difficulty in the diversification argument is that this 
argument can justify a preference for a strong group, such as the white 
racial group or the male sex, where, in a given instance, there is a sub-
representation of such group within a pool of other candidates at a 
lower socio-economic level.  Dworkin and Piss would respond to this 
argument that affirmative action favoring a strong group and 
disadvantaging a weak group, when the stronger group has historically 
discriminated against the weaker group, is stigmatized. And yet, in this 
case, if there is a local sub-representation of the strong group, an 
attempt to serve the value of diversity through affirmative action 
entails the cost of further oppression of the weaker group and the 
intensification of its feelings of deprivation.  A similar price is not paid 
by the stronger group when its members are rejected under the classical 
affirmative action formula.  In addition, rejected members of the 
stronger group will still benefit from their macro-social station in 
seeking alternative positions, unlike members of the weaker group who 
are rejected under the given scenario.20  This explains why affirmative 
action in favor of stronger groups is shunned, even when those groups 
appear disadvantaged in a given instance.  It is owing to this 
contradiction, as well, that diversification cannot serve as the sole 
justification for sweeping affirmative action.  
2. The Integration Argument 
Members of minority groups should be given positions of 
influence so that their voices will be heard, thus creating, inter alia, 
 
19 William G. Tierney, The Parameters of Affirmative Action: Equity and Excellence in the 
Academy, 67(2) REVIEW OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH 165, 170-177 (1997); WALTER 
BROADNAX, DIVERSITY & AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN PUBLIC SERVICE (2000). 
20 As the default statistical disparity in hiring and admissions determined to be caused by 
such discrimination will presumably continue to apply to any future application they submit 
at another institution. See Jr, Roland & Pager, Devah & Spenkuch, Jörg, Racial Disparities in 
Job Finding and Offered Wages, Journal of Law and Economics. 56. 10.2139/ssrn.1934590 
(2011). See as well Georgetown University Center on Education and the Workforce, Our 
Separate & Unequal Public Colleges: How Public Colleges Reinforce White Racial Privilege 
and Marginalize Black and Latino 
Students (2018). 
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human leadership infrastructure from amongst that group.  This 
objective can, under the appropriate circumstances, justify affirmative 
action.21 
However, it seems that the reservations we voiced above with 
respect to the diversification argument are equally applicable here. The 
stated purpose can, at best, justify the attainment of a critical mass of 
the represented perspective of the minority group to achieve the 
desired result.  Moreover, to the extent that we mean to achieve 
integration rather than simple diversification, it would seem necessary 
to select specifically the greatest talent from among the minority 
group, since merely inflating the pool of candidates would not promote 
the objectives of integration if said candidates lack the minimal 
threshold talent level required to “play the integration game,” so to 
speak.22 
If so, it becomes difficult to justify the blanket admission of the 
“sons of neurosurgeons” based on the considerations of diversification 
or integration.  Even if we assume that these candidates possess the 
minimum skills necessary, it stands to reason that there will be those 
within the minority group that are better suited than they, who are 
sufficient to comprise the aforesaid critical mass.  The former cannot 
triumph in the internal competition within the group, so the latter will, 
in any event, ultimately form the crucial leadership infrastructure for 
the purposes of integration, rendering the project obsolete.23  Thus, this 
argument is similarly unsuited to supporting the wide application of 
affirmative action policies.  
3. The Egalitarian Justice Argument 
Under the egalitarian justice argument for affirmative action, a 
more equitable distribution of wealth and commodities, including jobs 
and academic knowledge, is desirable.  Since the process of winning 
the right to jobs or academic enrichment is a competition between 
candidates, a fair distribution should allocate jobs or the right to study 
according to the result of a fair competition. Fair competition means a 
 
21 Cynthia L. Estlund, “Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, Integration, and Affirmative 
Action in the Workplace”, 26(1) BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW 1 
(2005). 
22  Id, p. 15-18; Elizabeth S. Anderson, “Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict 
Scrutiny”,  77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1195 (2002). 
23 PAUL BURSTEIN, A STRONG GROUP WITHIN A MINORITY GROUP AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
(1994); GAMSON & MODIGLIANI, supra, note 3. 
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competition that gives each competitor equal opportunities to win the 
competition.24 
Under this approach, as long as competition is fair, and equality 
of opportunities is maintained, there is no need for affirmative action.  
Affirmative action becomes necessary when a particular group does 
not enjoy equal opportunities, and thus has no fair chance of winning 
the competition.  The argument is that, in order to bring the group to a 
position of fair opportunities, the process must be altered to account 
for their presumed starting disadvantage.25 
In terms of affirmative action as a matter of public policy, this 
author prefers to focus on the possible justifications for affirmative 
action arising from considerations of egalitarian justice (equality 
assurance), for two reasons. 
Firstly, the justifications of diversification and integration 
seem to have no bearing on the plane of individual rights. The objects 
of these actions focus on the communal entity and not the individual; 
for example, if the idea is to ensure that the perspective of a certain 
minority group finds expression in the public discourse or in academia, 
it would stand to reason that identity and entitlement of the particular 
members selected from that group would not affect such selection one 
way or the other.26  Secondly, and more importantly, as these 
arguments don’t concern the individual rights of the minority members 
at all, they can hardly be seen to compete with the rights of the majority 
members that could be impaired through their broad application.27  
One could attempt to resolve this difficulty, in respect of the 
diversification and integration arguments, by noting that the focus on 
the individual skill criterion preferred under the meritocratic regime, 
to the detriment of welfare policies intended to promote weaker 
populations, is itself a mere matter of public policy, rather than a 
“right” afforded the party who would be chosen under such regime.  In 
theory, were the policy regime to favor the societal benefits afforded 
by equal distribution rather than meritocracy, we could just as easily 
argue for the minority member’s “right” to be accepted as a 
consequence of their right to equal opportunity.  Alternatively, it could 
be argued that any such discrimination, whether on the basis of 
 
24 Liff, Diversity and Equal Opportunities, supra, note 19. 
25 , “Equity, Equality, and Need, supra, note 15.   
26 Id. 
27  Jimmy Chan & Erik Eyster, “Does Banning Affirmative Action Lower College Student 
Quality?”, 93(3) THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 858 (2003). 
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meritocracy or egalitarian justice, is a violation of the principle of 
equality; that is, that we are impairing the rights of others to equal 
opportunity by always favoring those with specific qualifications 
deemed superior—not least, considering that many of the traits we 
deem essential qualifiers for different positions are natural traits, rather 
than acquired traits.28  These approaches would seek to resolve the coal 
miner’s daughter dilemma by negating the legitimacy of the majority 
member’s “right” to be accepted on the basis of equal opportunity, thus 
allowing us to implement a policy of affirmative action to promote the 
equal opportunity rights of minorities without worrying about the 
infringement incurred to such rights.29 
This argument, while perhaps seeming radical at the outset, is 
not without substance.  Dworkin concurred that rejection of the person 
with the highest qualifications does not infringe on their individual 
rights.  Dworkin distinguishes between the right to equal treatment—
that is, the right to receive the same portion as everyone else—and the 
right to be treated as an equal, that is, to have one’s interests addressed 
 
28  Without wishing to become entangled in the wider discussion, this approach is not 
inconsistent with John Rawls’ assertion of birth-acquired talents and qualifications as little 
more than luck of the draw, and thus, an illegitimate criterion for discrimination under any 
equitable regime of equal opportunity (See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition, 
Cambridge, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, pp. 63-65 (1999)). This is 
differentiated from Dworkin’s distinction, as provided below, between the right to equal 
opportunity and the right to equal treatment, which does not seek to challenge the basis for a 
meritocratic right, but rather, the extent to which it must be protected under a regime of 
egalitarian justice. On the other hand, an argument could also be made on the grounds of “self-
actualization” as a basic right, whereby the more qualified candidate, even by virtue of birth 
lottery, cannot be legitimately prevented from reaching their full potential without due cause. 
This would certainly seem to be the conclusion implied by Maslow’s “pyramid of needs,” 
which places self-actualization at the top of the pyramid of human needs (and, consequentially, 
human rights). See Maslow, A. H. A Theory of Human Motivation, PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, 
50(4), pp. 382-386 (1943); in respect of the translation of this need into a protected human 
right, see Christian Bay, The Structure of Freedom, NEW YORK, ATHENEUM pp. 95, 325 (1965). 
Similarly, as early as Aristotle, we see the exploration of self-actualization as a requirement 
of the human psyche; see Sachs, Joe, Aristotle’s Physics: A Guided Study (Masterworks of 
Discovery), New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, pp. 78-79. 245 (1995). While the resolution 
of these competing viewpoints merits deeper discussion in their own right, they are outside 
the scope of this paper, as Dworkin’s defense already assumes the inclusion of self-
actualization as a right worthy of protection.  
29 Robert F. Schoeni & Rebecca M. Blank, “What has Welfare Reform Accomplished? 
Impacts on Welfare Participation, Employment, Income, Poverty, and Family Structure”, 
NBER WORKING PAPER No. 7627 (2000), available at: www.nber.org/papers/w7627.pdf; 
Arthur J. Goldberg, “Equality and Governmental Action”, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 205-207 (1964). 
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with equal concern and dignity to those of everyone else.30  He argues 
that the right to be treated as an equal is a right that always exists, and 
is unqualified; however, the right to equal treatment can sometimes be 
qualified.  For example, both the difficult medical patient and the easy 
patient are entitled to be taken seriously and treated with respect.  
However, if we have reached the conclusion that the difficult patient 
needs urgent and intensive treatment, then the “right” to equal 
treatment is superseded by the differing needs of the two.  Similarly, 
in our case, while the holder of the preferred qualifications is entitled 
to equal consideration for the position, this does not necessarily 
translate into a “right” to equal treatment, which, as a preference of 
policy, may nonetheless be superseded to combat discrimination of 
minorities, or for matters of public welfare policy, for that matter. 
While this is one approach to resolve the difficulties in 
justifying affirmative action on the grounds of egalitarian justice, 
Dworkin’s case is itself, not free of difficulties. For my part, this author 
believes that it can be said that if the miner’s daughter is better and 
more qualified, then she should be theoretically entitled, all other 
factors neutral, to be accepted for the position, since the dismissal of 
her candidacy would necessitate the negation of her fair opportunity 
consideration based on qualifications that, at least on the theoretical 
level, are attainable to all.  To the extent that such entitlement does 
exist, we are charged with justifying its negation in pursuit of any 
communal interest.  So the “miner’s daughter” dilemma continues to 
pose an issue for the purposes of our review. 
“       .D Soft” Affirmative Action and “Hard” Affirmative 
Action 
Regarding both rights and policy-oriented justifications, it is 
worth noting another important distinction to be made when it comes 
to affirmative action: The distinction between “soft” affirmative action 
and “hard” affirmative action.31 
The first expression of the violation of equality of 
opportunities, despite the advantage of qualifications, is discrimination 
 
30  JAMES P. STERBA, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE FUTURE (2009) (henceforth: STERBA, 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE FUTURE); Jonatan, “What Was Affirmative Action”, 76(2) 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION (1986). 
31 Louis P. Pojman, “The Case against Affirmative Action”, 12(1) INT’L J. OF APPLIED 
PHILOSOPHY, 97 (1998) (henceforth: Pojman, The Case Against Affirmative Action).   
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against hiring or academic candidates that, theoretically, should have 
been accepted under the framework of a meritocracy, with such 
discrimination resulting from the existence of prejudices, negative 
stereotypes, or bias in admissions criteria or entrance examinations.  
Affirmative action is intended to correct this discrimination by 
balancing the “opposite preference” (i.e., the prejudice in question.)  
This is affirmative action in the “soft” sense.32  Under the 
circumstances stated above, discrimination results in an 
underestimation of the inherent potential of the individual from the 
targeted minority (it should be clarified that we refer here to either 
quality in practice, or potential that will be realized in the near future, 
as opposed to “historical” potential that has been previously impaired 
and can no longer be realized.)  When we believe that the inherent 
potential of the minority candidate who was admitted surpasses that of 
the majority candidate who was rejected on account of the policy of 
affirmative action, this amounts to soft affirmative action.  This kind 
of discrimination does not harm the principle of equality, and is, in any 
event, demanded out of meritocratic considerations (i.e., the principle 
that the “best man gets the job.”)33 
The establishment of this circumstance would be demonstrated 
by sub-representation of the group, despite the existence of member 
candidates for positions or studies, so that it is unlikely that 
meritocratic criterion justifies this sub-representation, given the 
distribution of skills between the groups. 
Furthermore, this state of economic disadvantage must be such 
that it cannot be remedied by budgeting reallocations.  If there are 
indeed entry barriers to the labor market from cultural-ideological 
sources, solely improving the economic situation of the candidates will 
not help them integrate into the labor market.  Thus, the 
implementation of affirmative action policies is the only recourse. 
In contrast, “hard” affirmative action represents a situation in 
which meritocratic considerations (which, we may assume for the 
purposes of this discussion, represent a fundamental public interest) 
are necessarily impaired by the discrimination.  In this case, we wish 
to prefer a candidate who is qualitatively inferior, based on the 
conception that, were it not for past discrimination, they could 
 
32 Cynthia DuBois, “The Impact of ‘Soft’ Affirmative Action Policies on Minority Hiring in 
Executive Leadership: The Case of the NFL’s Rooney Rule”, 18(1) AMERICAN LAW AND 
ECONOMICS REVIEW 208 (2016).  
33  Id. 
15
Menashe: How Actions Affirm
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
538 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 36 
potentially have been more suited at present.  The argument for this 
kind of affirmative action is, effectively, to correct the estimated 
results of historical inequality—results that impair the inherent 
potential of the specific individual in the present.34  
At this point, we must ask: Should the egalitarian justice 
approach see the meritocratic criterion of the disbursement of jobs 
according to qualifications as an exclusive criterion?  Even according 
to the approach that the criterion of qualifications should not be 
exclusive, it remains a prerequisite for admission to studies or for 
employment that the candidates possess the minimal threshold skills 
required to study or perform the relevant work.  This being the case, 
we must ponder: Why not determine the qualifications criterion as an 
exclusive criterion, according to which the chosen candidate will not 
only be “fit enough” but also “the most qualified?” 
The answer is that a person who receives a position may also 
earn high income, prestige, and status.  These resources are translated 
into power.  Since wealth and education determine social status, 
wealth, and education gaps in society are translated into power gaps, 
and hence, influence power dynamics.  Since the policy of acceptance 
to study and to work thus has a profound impact on the power 
dynamics in society, it is appropriate that an approach of egalitarian 
justice seeks to create an equitable balance of power in respect of the 
allocation of such positions.  This fair division must be such as to 
nominally eliminate the gaps between population subsegments that are 
large enough to translate into power dynamics.  In order to create this 
situation, it is necessary to deviate from the meritocratic criterion on 
the specific level, since relying on this criterion as an exclusive 
distribution criterion runs the risk of reinforcing the prior unequal 
distribution of power dynamics.35 
In addition, when groups are at the margins of the labor market, 
they often find themselves unable to cross the minimum threshold 
required for the realization of their freedoms, such as the ability to 
finance legal disputes to defend their rights or exercise freedom of 
expression through access to the mass media.  Property owners and 
other wealth holders, on the other hand, require a lower standard to be 
substantively free, because their rights are not threatened by any 
 
34 Pojman, The Case Against Affirmative Action, supra, note 46.  
35  PETER BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE. NEW YORK: ROUTLEDGE (2nd 
Edition, 1986); G. A. Cohen, “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice”, 99(4) ETHICS – AN 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 906 (1989). 
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external group, while the goods already in their possession guarantee 
their ability to exercise their freedoms.  As a result, true egalitarian 
justice requires a fair division of the tools through which basic needs 
can be purchased and equitable distribution of access to sources of 
wealth and power in society (i.e., education and employment.)36 
Clearly, hard affirmative action must be applied with caution.  
It should be noted that, with this form of affirmative action, we are 
adopting a historical outlook, and examining the ways that such history 
affects the present (and we must emphasize that, ultimately, it is this 
influence on the present that is relevant to us.)  As such, this approach 
necessarily involves probing an alternate-reality scenario: What would 
have occurred were it not for that original discrimination?  Moreover, 
the implementation of the discriminatory mechanism is itself fraught 
with additional difficulties beyond those that normally plague 
hypothetical exercises.  We will present these in order from the 
simplest to the most complex.37 
Firstly, there is the pragmatic issue that the individual is 
unlikely to benefit if there is an excessive gap between their actual 
talents and the minimal requirements necessary for the position 
afforded them. 
Secondly, there is an unquestionable affront to the public 
interest in qualified appointees here—and this interest can weigh quite 
heavily.  Take, for instance, the implementation of affirmative action 
for the position of a cardiovascular surgeon, resulting in the selection 
of a certain child prodigy who, owing to discrimination, never acquired 
sufficient education and whose skills, therefore, were never developed 
(and will not develop in the near future)—over another person with 
excellent skills, albeit inferior to those that might potentially have been 
acquired by the prodigy (but are now lost.)  In other words, the public 
is harmed by being forced to depend on the provision of services by 
the less qualified service provider in the present. 
Thirdly, the one seeking to implement hard affirmative action 
bears the burden of demonstrating that the only manner of correcting 
the original discrimination is by exercising further discrimination (i.e., 
affirmative action.)  In this sense, there is a concern that we may be 
attempting to right a wrong with another wrong.  In theory, the better 
 
36 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political 
not Metaphysical”, 14(3) PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 223 (1985). 
37  JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLITICS, CULTURE, AND 
JUSTICE IN AMERICA (1996). 
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way to correct the original discrimination in such cases would be 
through the diversion of public funds.  The principles of corrective 
justice would seem to warrant that the one to suffer to correct the 
wrong ought to be the one that committed the wrong in the first place.  
Instead, our scenario sees the wrong committed by the public being 
paid for by a specific individual who is not responsible for the original 
wrong.38  
We can argue, in this regard, that no real harm in this instance 
is incurred to the more talented candidate.  As noted above, since the 
holder of the preferred qualifications does not have a “right” to be 
admitted to study or work due to their superior qualifications, but only 
the right to be afforded an equal opportunity to be considered on the 
basis of their qualifications, there is no grounds for the argument that 
hard affirmative action is a correction of injustice through further 
injustice (as we noted above, Dworkin afforded the privileged person 
a right he termed “the right to be treated as an equal,” rather than a 
right to “equal treatment.”)39 
Finally, returning to the difficulties with hard affirmative 
action, there is some challenge to establish what would, prima facie, 
appear to be a prerequisite for applying hard affirmative action on the 
basis of a claim of ideological oppression: We should need to examine 
if there was a causal mechanism linking the overarching oppression to 
the impairment to the ability of members of the minority to realize their 
potential.  After all, this is not necessarily always true; indeed, in some 
cases, it is ultimately the mechanism of oppression itself that serves as 
a catalyst for members of the minority to reach their potential.  As such, 
we should need to obtain empirical evidence that the ideological 
oppression spurred estimated individual injuries on a wide scale 
against members of the minority group.  We refer here to “injury” in 
the sense of limiting the ability of the disadvantaged minority’s 
members to realize their individual potential as a result of the 
internalization of the worldview that presents them as powerless, 
talentless, etc.40 
 
38  Richard Delgado, “Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really want 
to Be ARole Model?”, MICH. L. REV. (1990-1991); Bret Stephens, “The Curse of Affirmative 
Action”, NEW YORK TIMES (2018), available at: 
www.nytimes.com/2018/10/19/opinion/harvard-case-affirmative-action.html. 
39  Supra, note 38, Id. . 
40 BIAS IN THE WORKPLACE, supra, note 20; National Research Council (US) Panel on Race, 
Ethnicity, and Health in Later Life, UNDERSTANDING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN 
HEALTH IN LATE LIFE: A RESEARCH AGENDA (RA Bulatao & NB Anderson, eds., 2004). 
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While reaching a positive determination on the individual level 
in this regard may seem like an insurmountable task, we can 
nonetheless propose a rule of thumb that will generally negate the 
fulfillment of the prerequisite: We can distinguish between systemic, 
powerful and ongoing ideological discrimination against a minority, 
and between a localized stigma that does not generally present a real 
risk of being internalized and adopted by the minority itself, thus 
negating the fulfillment of the causal link criterion.41  Granted that this 
does not provide us with true epistemic certainty of the existence of a 
causal link, but only a potentially strong correlation between the two 
phenomena; however, the reasons we have mentioned above that make 
it difficult to quantify injuries sustained through internalization of 
oppression apply equally to identifying the causal link we would 
ideally like to see demonstrated.  After all, how could we definitively 
demonstrate a link to an injury that cannot be definitively demonstrated 
itself?  Thus, as in this previous discussion, the correlation that can be 
drawn between the two factors is perhaps the surest and most 
accurate—and, in any event, the only—means we have of establishing 
the existence of such a link in any epistemic sense.  
When considering the justification for applying a policy of 
affirmative action, we must remember, as well, that there are different 
techniques available for implementing such a policy, with varying 
degrees of impact on the rights of the majority group members.  This 
knowledge can be used to gauge and, as needed, adjust and fine-tune 
the degree of impact that we must justify in order to set a policy of 
affirmative action in motion.  For instance, affirmative action can be 
achieved through quotas, i.e., by imposing a direct obligation on an 
organization to achieve a certain level of representation of the minority 
group among its membership.  Alternatively, we can use a system of 
targets, whereby it is sufficient for the organization to invest “sincere 
efforts” to achieve a target of representation that the organization sets 
for itself.  Such an expression of sincere effort could include, for 
instance, requiring the organization that fails to meet its representation 
targets to examine alternative ways to achieve this target by reviewing 
the reasons for the failure of its efforts.42  Yet another technique for 
enforcing affirmative action is to impose the burden of proof on the 
organization to demonstrate that sincere efforts have been made to 
 
41 Joe R. Feagin, “Discrimination: Motivation, Action, Effects, and Context”, 6 ANN. REV. 
SOCIAL 1 (1980). 
42 STUART OSKAMP, REDUCING PREJUSTICE AND DISCRIMINATION (2013). 
19
Menashe: How Actions Affirm
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
542 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 36 
attain the desired level of representation, or that it was justified in 
preferring candidates belonging to the dominant group to candidates 
belonging to a group eligible under the affirmative action policy.43 
Thus, when weighing the relative justifications for 
implementing a policy of affirmative action in a given circumstance, 
we must also consider the options available for implementing such a 
policy, their relative likelihood in achieving their goals, and the impact 
that this probabilistic equation has on the burden of justification for 
implementing such a policy.  For example, we may find it easier to 
defend a policy that is 100% effective at supporting the rights of 
minorities against an anticipated impact, only 20% likely to impair the 
rights of others, etc. 
Of course, bringing such considerations into the equation 
requires us to carefully examine and quantify the full impacts, both 
positive and negative, of any proposed policy of affirmative action 
before seeking to justify its implementation.  
IV. EVALUATION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN LIGHT OF THE 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
On the empirical level, several decades following the 
introduction of affirmative action policies across the globe, it remains 
unclear if any significant positive results have been achieved.  In the 
United States, affirmative action programs appear to have only slightly 
improved the situation of African Americans and women in senior 
positions.  In Israel, the policy of affirmative action has only recently 
begun, and while there has been a significant improvement in the 
situation of women, similar progress has not been evidenced in the 
Arab sector (granted that, in all such cases, there is difficulty in 
attempting to compare the resultant dispersion and allocation of 
resources with a theoretical scenario spanning decades in which such 
policies were never implemented.)44  Taking this result into account, 
along with the above comments regarding the need to examine the 
probabilistic impact of any proposed policy in seeking to justify its 
 
43 Laya Sleiman, “A Duty to Make Reasonable Efforts and a Defense of the Disparate 
Impact Doctrine in Employment Discrimination Law”, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2677 (2003-
2004). 
44 David L. Chambers et al., The Real Impact of Eliminating Affirmative Action in American 
Law Schools: An ampirical Critique of Richard Sander’s Study, 54 STAN L. REV. 1855 (2004-
2005); T. Sowell, “Affirmative Action around the World: An Empirical Study” (2004). 
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implementation, it could be easily ventured that there is little chance 
of justifying a broad policy of affirmative action at all.  
One response we may offer to this criticism is that, had it not 
been for affirmative action, the situation would undoubtedly have been 
worse, even if we are incapable of quantifying this disparity exactly. 
While this answer raises a very reasonable proposition, it is 
nonetheless undeniably speculative, and operatively no more 
convincing than the opposite assumption, that affirmative action did 
not prevent a worsening of the situation—a no less reasonable 
assumption.  
Another answer that could be ventured is that the presumed 
failure of the policy is not in the underlying principle of affirmative 
action, but rather, in the manner of its implementation; that is, in the 
field of enforcement.  Several sociological studies have linked the 
failure of such policies to the lack of determination and resolve in 
implementing affirmative action programs.  Moreover, in the United 
States, alongside affirmative action programs were ongoing efforts on 
the part of the conservative majority to curb and curtail those same 
programs, some of which resulted in real obstacles to the 
implementation of affirmative action, including legal obstacles, such 
as in the Beka case.45  While, once more, somewhat speculative in 
nature, this argument nonetheless succeeds in shedding some doubt on 
the discouraging findings presented above.  
A more pedestrian argument could be offered that an 
insufficient amount of time has elapsed for the positive results of 
affirmative action to be seen on a wide scale in society.  These 
influences may only be observed in future generations, which will be 
raised in a different culture and societal situation, wherein their parents 
are already achieving success as full partners in society.  
Regardless, if we focus on the personal rights of individuals 
who belong to minority groups—even divorced of the question of 
affirmative action’s successes on the group level—it is possible to say 
that affirmative action produces an equitable result.  Thus, I would 
argue that affirmative action can certainly be justified in respect of the 
 
45 Jonathan S. Leonard, “The Impact of Affirmative Action Regulation and Equal 
Employment Law on Black Employment”, 4(4) J. OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 47 (1990); 
Tanner Colby, “Affirmative Action: It’s Time for Liberals to Admit it isn’t Work” (FEB 10, 
2014), available at: slate.com/human-interest/2014/02/affirmative-action-its-time-for-
liberals-to-admit-it-isnt-working.html; Hva Hsu “The Risa and Fall of Affirmative Action”, 
THE NEW YORKER, available at: www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/15/the-rise-and-fall-
of-affirmative-action.   
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good rendered on the individual level, even if its macro-social impact 
is not established.46 
V. CONCLUSION 
In summary, from the above coarse review of the 
considerations in question, the importance of ensuring that the 
discussion of affirmative action does not become oversimplified is 
quite evident.  While certain justifications provided for the policy of 
affirmative action may seem insufficient, in some cases, to justify the 
impairment of equal opportunity rights incurred to the majority 
population—such as we witnessed in the “coal miner’s daughter” 
dilemma—these concerns can be mostly set aside in light of the injury 
that the status quo incurs to other interests and rights under 
circumstances of prejudice and historic inequality.  It is possible to 
counter these concerns, as well, by adjusting the methods proposed to 
implement a policy of affirmative action—such as by ensuring 
minimum requirements for program eligibility, focusing on measures 
with limited impact on majority group members where possible, and 
reliance on justifications that relate to the individual rights of the 
program beneficiaries. 
Accordingly, the solutions offered by this article focus on the 
personal right to equal opportunities of individuals belonging to the 
oppressed minority group, rather than community rights that are 
intended to promote interests of diversity and integration.  It is the 
position of this author that, when seeking to implement a policy of 
affirmative actions, it is necessary to examine whether the source of 
the discrimination in the specific instance is solely economic, or 
ideological, and to find an appropriate solution to correspond with such 
findings.  To the extent that measures can be taken to ensure a more 
equitable distribution resources without directly impairing the rights of 
individuals, this author would posit that there is no need to implement 
a more aggressive mechanism of affirmative action.  This would 
generally be the case only under circumstances of purely economic 
inequality, as described above.  If, however, the basis for 
discrimination is both ideological and economical, we must then 
consider the projected positive and negative impacts of the policy 
implementation and the alternatives available to policymakers—such 
 
46  FAYE J. CROSBY & FLETCHER A. BLANCHARD, “INTRODUCTION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
AND THE QUESTION OF STANDARDS,” AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN PERSPECTIVE 3 (1989). 
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as the option to adopt “soft” or “hard” affirmative action policies, and 
other variable options considered above—when determining the moral 
value and desired extent of such policy’s implementation. 
By implementing this formula, we can achieve the desired 
result whereby affirmative action is implemented responsibly and 
limited to the appropriate and relevant cases and measures, in a manner 
that optimally balances rights and interests of the various parties 
involved, and provides us with the most ethically defensible and 
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